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THREE ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS OF 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE DIFFICULTIES IN 
CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES* 
By PADMA DESAI and JAGDISH BHAGWATI 
I. Introduction 
THE recent entry of the Soviet economy into the world economy, in regard 
to trade, credit, and technology, has prompted much popular and some 
scientific discussion of the foreign exchange problems confronting the Soviet 
Union.1 However, the analysts of these problems have deployed, and the 
generalist discussions have occasionally confused, what are quite distinct 
concepts of the foreign exchange problems. 
It is necessary, therefore, todistinguish among three alternative concepts, 
which are in reality quite different from one another. These are: (1) Foreign 
Exchange Bottleneck; (2) Open Payments Deficit; and (3) Suppressed 
Payments Deficit. These are considered in Sections II-IV respectively. 
II. Foreign exchange bottleneck 
The concept of a foreign exchange bottleneck isa simple ex ante planning 
concept and has no intrinsic relationship (as we will shortly demonstrate) to 
the ex post payments deficit concepts. As developed in the planning litera- 
ture, it essentially amounts to arguing that, given the objective function and 
domestic resources-cum-technology of the planners, their inability to trans- 
form available into demanded goods is the effective constraint on increasing 
the value of this objective function. 
The classic statement of a foreign exchange bottleneck is in a simple 
corn-tractor model. The economy produces corn, saves and exports corn to 
import ractors which constitute investment and produce the corn. In this 
economy, let the current objective be to increase investment. This means 
buying more tractors from abroad. Now, if the finance minister cannot tax 
the economy into saving more corn, to purchase more tractors by exporting 
this corn, then the economy has a savings bottleneck. However, if the 
*Thanks are due to the National Science Foundation Grants No. SOC77-07254 and No. 
SOC77-07188 for financial support of the first and second authors respectively, in writing this 
paper. Thanks are due to Franklyn Holzman and Peter Neary for extremely helpful comments 
on an earlier draft of this paper. 
'Two examples of the latter are Holzman (1978), who analyzes why the CPEs run into 
payment deficits, and Desai (1978), who constructs and estimates a simple Swan-Solow model 
of the Soviet Union to calculate the social productivity of foreign credits to the Soviet Union, 
while considering conceptually also the foreign exchange bottleneck that is discussed in the text 
above. We have profited greatly from reading Holzman (1978), in writing this paper. 
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economy can be coaxed or taxed into more saving, but the economy faces a 
unitary price elasticity of demand in the world markets for its corn, foreign 
exchange receipts will not increase. Tractor imports and therefore invest- 
ment will not increase; we then have a transformation or foreign exchange 
bottleneck.2 
It will be evident to the reader that a necessary, though not sufficient 
condition for a foreign exchange bottleneck to exist is- the absence of the 
economy's ability to transform goods into one another in world markets at 
the initial world prices. I.e., a "small" country, which is atomistic in world 
markets, cannot have a foreign exchange bottleneck. [It follows equally that, 
compared to the free trade situation, such an economy will, for a more 
general class of objective functions (than merely maximizing the volume of 
investment), do better by restricting its trade: as is well known from the 
theory of optimal tariff in the presence of monopoly power in trade.] 
In the Soviet context it can be argued that the foreign exchange bottle- 
neck operates not with respect to growth of income, but rather with respect 
to a shift towards greater availability of consumer goods in total and in 
composition. 
This argument of foreign resource inflow being a constraint on the growth 
and diversification of consumption levels is best illustrated by reference to 
the classical and idealized demonstration of the foreign exchange bottleneck 
for developing countries in Fig. 1. 
Assume there that the economy, at the relevant point of time, has a 
production possibility vector, P: i.e., resources cannot be transferred from 
one sector to another.3 Let the two sectors be producing capital and 
consumer goods respectively a la the standard two-sector model. For the 
developing countries traditionally, the argument of the developmental plan- 
ners during the 1950s and 1960s was that a foreign exchange bottleneck 
existed for raising investment (i.e., availability of capital goods) and growth 
of income. For, starting from P, the foreign offer curve facing them was 
PQR and if the developing countries could save more than PW, say PN, the 
incremental ex ante savings worth NW would not yield any incremental 
imports of capital goods and hence there would be no increase in ex post 
investment. NW worth of consumer goods, saved by the developing coun- 
tries, would only accrue to foreigners via terms of trade loss from PQ to 
PV.4 
2 An early analysis of the foreign exchange bottleneck concept, and its differences from the 
concepts of payments deficits, is in Bhagwati (1966). An elegant treatment of the concept in a 
more elaborate framework is in Findlay (1971). In computable planning models, the concept 
has been used often by Hollis Chenery and his associates: e.g. Chenery and Bruno (1962). 
' That is, the "clay" assumption applies to all factors of production. 
'The super-imposition of the foreign offer curve PQR on the production point P is, of 
course, the technique due to Baldwin. The stretch QR represents unitary foreign elasticity of 
demand for the developing countries' exports of consumer goods. 
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FIG. 1 
The Soviet Union's present situation, on the other hand, may be idealized 
in this illustration by turning the dilemma on its head. With its objective of 
shifting availabilities in favor of consumer goods, the foreign exchange 
constraint for the Soviet Union would seem to imply a willingness, but not 
the ability (beyond PW' of capital goods) to transform capital goods' into 
consumer goods through foreign exchange earnings with foreign offer curve 
PQ'R'. The foreign exchange constraint of the Soviet Union, therefore, is 
indeed, as with developing countries, on shifting the availabilities between 
investment and consumption through trade. However, in the case of the 
developing countries, this translated into a constraint on growth of income; 
in the case of the Soviet Union, it amounts rather to a constraint on the 
composition of the growing income.6 
111. Open payments deficit 
In contrast to the ex ante planning concept of the foreign exchange 
bottleneck, the payments deficit concepts relate to the ex post mac- 
roeconomic situation. 
' The idealized treatment of the Soviet economy in Fig. 1 may appear unrealistic to the 
reader who knows that the Soviet Union exports mainly raw materials such as ores, timber, oil 
and gas, and chemicals such as potash and ammonia. This worry can be laid to rest by thinking 
of exports at the margin, as in fact we need to do here; and then it is readily seen that Fig. 1 is 
close enough to reality. Thus, recall that Soviet machinery exports are widely referred to in the 
Sovietological literature as "soft exports" whereas exports of raw materials beyond current 
levels appear infeasible owing to supply, rather than demand, difficulties. 
6 We may note explicitly that the argument in the text assumes that wage goods availability 
will not constrain the growth of Soviet income. 
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For "flow" current-account deficits, it is evident that an open payments 
deficit means that imports exceed exports ex post. Therefore we can amend 
the illustration in Fig. 1 to portray an open deficit simply as in Fig. 2. There, 
the production possibility curve is TT; production is at P; the world price 
line, identical with the domestic price line, is APD; the domestic expendi- 
ture line is BCE and the national income line is APD, so that the open 
deficit is AB (if measured in units of consumer goods) or equivalently DE 
(if measured in units of capital goods).7 With the consumption vector chosen 
at C, the deficit is "absorbed" as PQ of consumer goods and CQ of capital 
goods. 
Note two things. First, unlike the foreign exchange bottleneck concept 
which hinges critically on the assumption of monopoly power in trade, an 
open payments deficit can arise obviously regardless of whether the country 
is atomistic or not in world markets. Second, it is possible for such an open 
payments deficit to arise in several alternative ways. Holzman's (1978) 
7The equivalence of world and domestic prices, and the tangency of the latter with TI, are 
simplifying assumptions and can be relaxed without affecting anything essential in the argument 
in the text, of course. 
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interesting recent paper in fact argues that CPEs have a built in tendency to 
get into payments difficulties because they systematically either overestimate 
export earnings or overestimate production/income. Drawing on these two 
ideas, we will illustrate precisely some (but by no means all) of the ways in 
which CPEs may actually experience open payments deficits. 
A. Demand-determined open deficit 
First, consider cases where the CPE overestimates export performance, 
not because of supply difficulties but because of unduly optimistic assess- 
ment of world demand for its exports, but sticks to its import targets instead 
of revising them downwards. The resulting (world-) demand-determined 
open deficit may be illustrated for two polar cases: (i) where the export 
quantity is forecast accurately but the price is overestimated; and (ii) where 
the export price is forecast accurately, but the quantity is overestimated. 
(i) In Fig. 3(a), the first case is illustrated. The CPE plans ex ante for PQ 
exports in exchange for QC imports. However, the terms of trade turn out 
to be PE instead of PC. Thus the planned and actual exports PQ pay for 
only QE imports. With planned imports sticky at QC, the CPE then has to 
run an open payments deficit of CE. The effective social budget line then is 
RCS and exceeds the income line PE by the deficit. 
Note that the "adjustment mechanism" postulated here allows for the 
disequilibrium resulting from the ex post deterioration in export prices 
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running down of reserves and without permitting reallocation of consump- 
tion and production decisions so as to maximize some objective function 
subject to the constraints constituted by domestic transformation and ex post 
foreign transformation possibilities and borrowing stipulated at CE.8 
(ii) In Fig. 3(b), we illustrate the other polar case where the quantity of 
exports is overestimated and falls short of PQ by QQ', whereas their price 
and hence the terms of trade are correctly anticipated as PEC. Exporting 
PQ' however will pay only for Q'E imports, thus leaving a payments deficit 
of C'E to pay for the planned and actual imports CQ = C'Q'.' 
B. Supply-determined open deficit 
Consider next a situation where the failure in export performance comes 
from an overly optimistic assessment of production of exportables. 
(i) Then, assuming that the CPE is atomistic in world markets and can 
trade as much as it wants to, let P, be the expected production vector and Pa 
the actual ex post production vector, so that PaPe measures the shortfall in 
8 Thus, subject to these constraints, the maximization of a standard social utility function 
would evidently result in a different ex post equilibrium. 
9 Again, note that our depiction of the payments deficit with consumption at C' does not 
necessarily reflect an optimal ex post equilibrium. For, if we were to maximize a social utility 
function subject to TI, maximal exports of PQ' at terms of trade PE, and a deficit of C'E, we 
could wind up with consumption at a point other than C'. In addition, there is no reason, of 
course, to expect that a deficit equal to C'E is itself necessarily optimal. 
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exportable production. PeQ and QS represent the planned exports and 
imports respectively. If expenditure is not revised downwards a la Holzman 
(1978), expenditure and income will diverge by SR, which will constitute the 
open deficit. However, depending on what the planners choose to export in 
face of the production shortfall, the import level (but not the deficit) will 
vary; and it can differ from the ex ante level QS. In Fig. 4, if the shortfall in 
exportable production leads the planners to a fully offsetting reduction in 
(total) exports from PeQ to PaQ, the CPE will wind up importing altogether 
SQ, the planned level of imports. On the other hand, if part of the shortfall 
in exportable production is accommodated through reduced domestic availa- 
bility, exports will not be reduced as much. Thus, if they fall, not to PaQ but 
to PaQ', the payments deficit will remain the same (for it equals the 
postulated excess of expenditure over income) but the actual import level 
will rise to Q'S' (>QS). 
(ii) But we can tell an altogether different story, reflecting a different 
"adjustment mechanism." So far, we have argued with Holzman (1978) that 
the excess of expenditure over income is fixed by the assumption that 
anticipated expenditure is necessarily ex post expenditure while ex post 
income falls below anticipated income, and therefore that the trade deci- 
sions must accommodate to yield consistency with this. Rather, assume now 
that it is domestic expenditure that will adjust to accommodate the trade 
decisions. 
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exportable production by reducing exports from PeQ to PatQ'. The planned 
level of imports is sticky at SQ. Then R'H is clearly the level of imports that 
cannot be financed from export earnings. These imports then imply a 
corresponding, open payments deficit: a deficit in this instance that is smaller 
than under the Holzman (1978) assumptions: HR'< S'R' (= SR). 
In conclusion, note that the supply-determined open payments deficit can 
equally arise from shortfall in importable production. Thus the planned 
exports QPe, when effected, will yield in Fig. 5 the anticipated imports QR. 
But PPa, the shortfall in importable production, implies a shortfall then in 
domestic availability of RS importables which may lead to an open pay- 
ments deficit of identical magnitude to eliminate this shortfall. 
IV. Suppressed payments deficit 
In contrast o the open payments deficit, no matter what precise cir- 
cumstances cause and shape it, the suppressed payments deficit characterizes 
a situation where these same circumstances are not permitted to "spill over" 
into the balance of payments in the shape of an excess of imports over 
exports. 
In the case of market economies, this distinction between open and 
suppressed payments deficits i quite important for analytical purposes. For, 
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balance between expenditure and income by a suitable mix of mac- 
roeconomic policies which preserves unified exchange rates, and similarly in 
contrast to the open deficit situation which also permits the preservation of 
unified exchange rates, the suppressed deficit situation typically implies 
differential, effective xchange rates on foreign transactions. This is seen in 
the traditional foreign-exchange-market diagram in Fig. 6. There, the ex- 
change rate r* corresponds to an equilibrium, unified exchange rate that 
clears the market. The exchange rate F, leads to an excess demand for 
foreign exchange that could be met by an open deficit, financed by borrow- 
ing or use of reserves, of amount QR: this situation also yielding identical, 
unified exchange rates for export and import transactions (which underlie 
the supply and demand curves respectively). However, when the open deficit 
is suppressed, the exchange rate Fe generates supply of foreign exchange iFQ 
which is cleared in the market at the "premium-inclusive" price, or effective 
exchange rate, Fm; and therefore the effective xchange rates on exports (Fe) 
and on imports (Fm) are unequal in this suppressed-deficit situation. 
The general-equilibrium "real" counterpart of these distinctions in the 
traditional 2-sector model of trade theory is usually demonstrated as the 
free-trade solution for the equilibrium unified exchange rate, the free-trade- 
with-transfer (equal to the deficit) solution for the open deficit case, and a 
Price of 
foreign 
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tariff (implying a higher effective xchange rate on imports than on exports) 
solution for the suppressed deficit case. 
The "suppressed deficit" concept therefore permits us to examine exp- 
licitly the alllocational implications of managing the balance of payments, 
not by adjusting the exchange rate (and therewith the domestic and foreign 
residents' transactions), but by pegging the exchange rate and using ex- 
change controls to equate import payments to exchange earnings. 
Thus, aside from the obvious fact that an open payments deficit and a 
suppressed deficit differ because the open deficit implies increased current 
availability of resources to the economy, the open deficit also is charac- 
terized by an adjustment mechanism that ensures, ceteris paribus, unified 
exchange rates whereas the suppressed deficit does not. For CPEs, however, 
the latter distinction is not particularly relevant in view of the general 
delinking of the foreign payments situation from domestic production and 
consumption decisions. Thus, for the case illustrated in Fig. 3(a), the open 
deficit situation was not based on either steady-state optimality or even 
short-run optimality (given the production decision). The corresponding 
suppressed deficit situation again, if shown by winding up at E (implying 
that the imports take the entire adjustment burden), would not generally 
represent an optimal situation either. The distinction between open and 
suppressed deficits is therefore unlikely to be of the same significance for 
CPEs as it is regarded for the analysis of market economies: the welfare 
implications for resource allocation of these alternative situations are not as 
clear for the CPEs as they are for the market economies."01 
Columbia University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
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